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Abstract:   
Income mobility is often thought to equalize permanent incomes and thereby to improve 
social welfare. The welfare analysis of mobility often fails, however, to account for the 
cost of the variability of periodic incomes around permanent incomes. This paper 
assesses the net welfare benefit of mobility by assuming both a social aversion to 
inequality in permanent incomes and an individual aversion to variability in periodic 
incomes. The paper further investigates the combined (and comparative) impact of 
mobility and of the tax system (another presumed income equalizer) on the dynamics of 
income across time and on the inequality of income across individuals. Using panel 
data, we find that Canada’s tax system limits significantly the redistributive impact of 
mobility while also lowering considerably the cost of income variability. The permanent 
income equalizing effect of taxes can reach up to 23 percent of mean income at the 
higher values of inequality aversion that we use. Globally, the net social welfare effect of 
both mobility and taxation is (almost always) positive and substantial, often amounting to 
around 30 percent of mean income. For all choices of parameter values, the tax effect 
exceeds by far the net effect of mobility on inequality and social welfare. 
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1 Introduction
The paper is concerned with the welfare impact of income dynamics across
time and across individuals. Income mobility has at least two potential social wel-
fare effects. The first effect is to make the distribution of permanent incomes po-
tentially more equal than the distribution of periodic incomes (periodic incomes
being cross-sectional incomes). This is usually seen to increase social welfare.
Milton Friedman argued fifty years ago, for instance, that a society with a rigid in-
come distribution where everyone remains in the same position year after year can
almost certainly be declared “worst” than a mobile society with identical cross-
sectional inequality — see page 12 for a full quote. The second effect is to gener-
ate variability at the individual level, because of the time variability of individual
incomes that mobility induces. If individuals would prefer their incomes to be
distributed as equally as possible across time (because they are risk averse), then
this aspect of mobility will reduce social welfare. Gittleman and Joyce (1996)
argue in this respect that mobility may make it difficult to retain one’s position in
the distribution, thus making mobility less desirable.
To address these questions, the paper first follows the spirit of “mobility as
equalizer” introduced by Shorrocks (1978) and generalized by Maasoumi and
Zandvakili (1999). Methodologically and conceptually, this is different from the
use of mobility indices based on transition matrices — see Shorrocks (1976),
Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson (1992), Dardanoni (1993), Gottschalk and
Spolaore (2002a), and Klevmarken (2004) for more on this. Other approaches to
measuring mobility are suggested and surveyed by Shorrocks (1993), Fields and
Ok (1996), Fields and Ok (1999), Maasoumi (1998) and Fields (2010). In the
context of mobility as equalizer of incomes, inequality in permanent incomes is
compared to the average inequality of periodic incomes.1 The lower the level of
permanent income inequality, the higher is income mobility deemed to be.
This framework is enhanced to take into account the cost of the variability in
the distribution of periodic incomes if individuals are averse to income variability
across time. Aversion to temporal income variability is a natural assumption in
economics. The effect of such an aversion has, however, curiously not featured
prominently in the analysis of mobility — some of the rare exceptions include
Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002b) and Salas and Rabadán (1998). Mobility is
usually thought to be necessarily beneficial in social welfare terms; the income
1See, among many others, Chakravarty, Dutta, and Weymark (1985), Atkinson, Bourguignon,
and Morrisson (1992), Jarvis and Jenkins (1998), Salas and Rabadan (1998), Trede (1998), Salas
and Rabadán (1998), Benabou and Ok (2001), Creedy and Wilhelm (2002), and Beenstock (2004).
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variability costs are typically not taken into account in the social assessment of
the effects of mobility.
The combination of these two facets of mobility provides a unified framework
to trade off the advantage of mobility as “equalizer” across individuals and the cost
of mobility as “disequalizer” across time. Such a framework can also be useful
for the purposes of evaluating the social welfare effects of tax systems. There is
indeed an interesting analogy between the effects of mobility and taxation. In the
words of Benabou and Ok (2001), “[j]ust like a tax scheme maps pre-tax incomes
into post-tax incomes, a mobility process maps initial incomes into expected fu-
ture incomes, or more generally into expected levels of intertemporal welfare. The
extent to which the terminal distribution is equalized compared to the initial one
is then precisely measured by the degree to which the mapping is progressive”
(p.1). Equality of permanent incomes is increased by a progressive system; the
time variability of periodic incomes around permanent incomes is decreased by
tax progressivity. The precise quantitative welfare impact of progressivity nev-
ertheless depends on the distribution of pre-tax incomes and the structure of the
tax system. It also depends on the social evaluator’s aversion to variability across
time and to inequality across individuals.
Looking jointly at taxation and mobility helps assess both mobility’s impact
and the tax system’s impact on intertemporal social welfare. How much is the use-
fulness of mobility as a longer-term equalizer diminished by the presence of a pro-
gressive tax system? How much is the cost of mobility as a temporal disequalizer
reduced by a progressive tax system? Is the welfare benefit of tax progressivity
reduced or increased by the presence of mobility? How do the inequality-reducing
benefits and the variability-reducing benefits of tax progressivity compare? How
do the welfare benefits of mobility and taxation compare? These are some of the
original questions that this paper seeks to address, both through the provision of a
measurement framework and empirically.
The main empirical results (obtained from recent Canadian panel data) are
instructive. The cost of mobility in pre-tax income ranges from roughly 2 to 11
percent of pre-tax mean income for reasonable parameter values of aversion to
variability. The tax system reduces considerably that variability cost, halving it for
many parameter values. Mobility also contributes much less to the equalization of
permanent post-tax incomes than of permanent pre-tax incomes. The permanent
income equalizing effect of taxes can reach up to 23 percent of mean income at the
higher values of inequality aversion that we use. The global result is that the net
social welfare effect of both mobility and taxation is (almost always) positive and
usually very significant, often amounting to around 30 percent of mean income.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents formally the
measurement of individual and social welfare. Section 3 shows how the two as-
pects of mobility influence social welfare. It also derives measures of the impact
of taxation on mobility, examines the effects of taxation on social welfare, and
decomposes the overall effects of taxation and mobility on social welfare. Section
4 provides two methods for correcting statistical biases in the estimation of the
welfare cost of the variability of periodic incomes. Section 5 applies the method-
ology to Canadian panel data. Section 6 concludes briefly. The Appendix presents
proofs of some of the results and contains additional methodological precisions.
2 Measurement
Let the variables x and y stand for pre- and post-tax income, respectively,
which we assume to be positive. The “tax system”, which maps x into y, is a
shorthand for the “net tax and transfer system”. Transfers are also allowed, and
the tax net of transfers can be negative (we then have a net positive transfer).
Let Fx,y(·, ·) be the joint distribution function of pre- and post-tax incomes. The
marginal distributions are denoted as Fx(·) and Fy(·) for x and y, respectively, and
can be obtained as
Fx(v) =
∫ y=∞
y=0
∫ x=v
x=0
dFx,y(x, y) (1)
and similarly for Fy(·). To focus on the distributive effects of the tax system, we
assume that the mean of x and y have been normalized to 100, so that
∫
vdFx(v) =∫
vdFy(v) = 100. We further index individuals by their characteristics ω, of
which the distribution function is Fω(·). Fs|ω(·) is the distribution of income s
(with s equal to x or to y) conditional on an individual having characteristics ω
(we call this individual ω for short).
2.1 Individual welfare
A useful tool throughout the analysis will be that of “permanent income”. For
individual ω, it is given by
s(ω) =
∫
zdFs|ω(z) (2)
with s = x and s = y for pre- and post-tax income respectively. Note here that
we are not discounting future incomes and/or utilities. Discounting the future
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could readily be done but at some expositional cost. Individuals are assumed to
be averse to income variability over time. Their utility at period t, which we call
periodic utility, is given by Uǫ(s),
Uǫ (s) =
{
s1−ǫ
1−ǫ
, for ǫ 6= 1,
ln (s) , for ǫ = 1, (3)
where ǫ ≥ 0 is a parameter of relative risk aversion. Uǫ (s) is a standard utility
function in the literature; although its constant level of inequality/risk aversion
simplifies exposition, other choices of functional forms are possible in our paper’s
framework. Denote the inverse of the utility function u = Uǫ(s) by
U−1ǫ (u) =
{
(1− ǫ)u
1
1−ǫ , when ǫ 6= 1,
exp (u) , when ǫ = 1.
(4)
In the manner of Atkinson (1970) for the measurement of social welfare
and inequality, let χ(ω; ǫ) be the pre-tax “equally distributed equivalent income”
(EDEI) for individual ω. χ(ω; ǫ) is the value of pre-tax income that, if enjoyed by
individual ω at each period of his lifetime, would yield him the same average util-
ity over time as that generated by the distribution of his periodic incomes.2 Using
(3) and (4), χ(ω; ǫ) is thus given by
χ(ω; ǫ) = U−1ǫ
(∫
Uǫ(z)dFx|ω(z)
)
. (5)
For ǫ = 0, χ(ω; 0) equals x(ω). χ(ω; ǫ) is in general lower than x(ω) because
of ω’s aversion to periodic income variability. The difference x(ω)− χ(ω; ǫ) can
be interpreted as a risk premium that ω would be willing to pay to eliminate the
variability in his periodic incomes.
Figure 1 helps understand this. Values of periodic utility Uǫ(x) are shown at
two different pre-tax incomes x1(ω) and x2(ω) for a single individual ω. Aver-
age pre-tax income across time is given by x(ω). Average utility across time is∫
Uǫ(z)dFx|ω(z) = 0.5 (Uǫ(x1(ω)) + Uǫ(x2(ω))) = Uǫ(χ(ω; ǫ)). χ(ω; ǫ) is thus
the EDEI of individual ω. The difference between x(ω) and χ(ω; ǫ) on the hor-
izontal axis is the welfare cost of ω’s income variability, measured in units of
average income.
Define γ(ω; ǫ) analogously as the post-tax EDEI for individual ω:
2Salas and Rabadan (1998) follow this approach to decompose overall intertemporal inequality
into between- and within-household contributions.
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γ(ω; ǫ) = U−1ǫ
(∫
Uǫ(z)dFy|ω(z)
)
. (6)
Further, let ξ(ω; ǫ) be the post-tax EDEI for individual ω, estimated by applying
the variability in pre-tax incomes on permanent post-tax incomes, y(ω):
ξ(ω; ǫ) = y(ω)
(
χ(ω; ǫ)
x(ω)
)
. (7)
Seen differently, ξ(ω; ǫ) gives the EDEI of the distribution of x scaled by
y(ω)/x(ω), that is, by forcing post-tax incomes y to display the same periodic
inequality as pre-tax incomes x. The greater the progressivity of the tax system,
the greater the gap between γ(ω; ǫ) and ξ(ω; ǫ).3 For a proportional tax system,
we have that ξ(ω; ǫ) = γ(ω; ǫ).
2.2 Social welfare
We measure social welfare over the distribution of individual EDEI, that is,
over the distribution of permanent incomes corrected for the cost of periodic in-
come variability — we refer to this as “permanent welfare”. Thus, we define
Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) as the EDEI of the distribution of pre-tax permanent welfare χ(ω; ǫ),
Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) = U
−1
ρ
(∫
Uρ(χ(ω; ǫ))dFΩ(ω)
)
. (8)
Wγ(ǫ)(ρ) and Wξ(ǫ)(ρ) are defined accordingly. ρ is the aversion to between-
individual inequality. If Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) were enjoyed by all, it would generate the same
social welfare as that generated by the distribution of χ(ω; ǫ).
Let Ws(ρ) then be the EDEI of permanent incomes for the pre-tax (s = x) and
post-tax (s = y) distributions
Ws(ρ) = U
−1
ρ
(∫
Uρ(s(ω))dFΩ(ω)
)
. (9)
Let also Ws(ρ) be the EDEI of periodic incomes, both for pre-tax (s = x) and
post-tax (s = y) incomes:
Ws(ρ) = U
−1
ρ
(∫
Uρ(z)dFs(z)
)
. (10)
3See the Appendix for a proof of this statement.
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Ws(ρ) can be interpreted as social welfare imposing time anonymity on social
evaluation. Time anonymity says that a social evaluator should show indifference
regarding the dependence of temporal incomes: how periodic incomes are allo-
cated intertemporally across individuals is not an input into social evaluation in
the presence of time anonymity. The one-period temporal distributions of incomes
are sufficient for social evaluation purposes; it is not necessary to know the joint
distribution (and the dependence) of these temporal incomes for these purposes.
Note that if ǫ = ρ, that is, if aversion to variability and inequality are the same,
then Wx(ρ) = Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) and Wy(ρ) = Wγ(ǫ)(ρ). The above notation concerning
the distribution of individual and social welfare is summarized in Table 1.
3 The impact of mobility and taxation on social wel-
fare
3.1 Impact of mobility on social welfare
A general belief is that mobility serves as an equalizer of permanent incomes.
The stochastic nature of mobility is, however, also a source of periodic income
variability. As a result, we can think of mobility as having two potential effects
on social welfare:
1. it generates an uncertainty cost if individuals are averse to income variabil-
ity across time;
2. it makes the distribution of permanent welfare more equal than the distribu-
tion of periodic welfare.
To quantify these two effects, define
Mx(ǫ; ρ) = Wχ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wx(ρ) (11)
as the net effect of mobility on pre-tax social welfare. The first term on the right-
hand-side of (11) is welfare corrected for the cost of income variability and for
the benefit of permanent welfare equalization. The second term is social welfare
without such adjustments. This can be decomposed into two components:
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Mx(ǫ; ρ) ≡Wχ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wx(ρ)
= Wχ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wx(ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M1x(ǫ;ρ)≤0
+Wx(ρ)−Wx(ρ),︸ ︷︷ ︸
M2x(ρ)≥0
(12)
where
• M1x(ǫ; ρ) is the effect of periodic income variability, which is negative for
ǫ > 0,
• and M2x(ρ) is the effect of the equalization of permanent pre-tax welfare,
which is positive for ρ > 0.
The mobility effects on post-tax social welfare are obtained by replacing x, χ
and x by y, γ and y in (11) and (12). Whenever ǫ = ρ, that is, when across-
time inequality aversion is exactly offset by across-individual inequality aver-
sion, the negative variability effect is exactly counterbalanced by the positive ef-
fect of the equalization of permanent welfare, so that M1x(ǫ; ǫ) = −M2x(ǫ) and
Mx(ǫ; ǫ) = My(ǫ; ǫ) = 0. This is because it then does not matter for social eval-
uation purposes whether the variability in the distribution of periodic incomes is
variability across individuals or variability across time. The social welfare cost of
both is the same. Any reduction in permanent welfare inequality induced by the
effect of mobility is exactly canceled out from a social welfare perspective by the
income variability that this introduces.4
When ρ > ǫ > 0, we have that Mx(ǫ; ρ) > 0 and the welfare effect of the
equalization of permanent welfare dominates that of the cost of income variability.
Mobility-accounting social welfare Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) is thus larger than time-anonymous
social welfare Wx(ρ). An increase in periodic income variability (which decreases
Wx(ρ)) can then yet improve social welfare Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) if it induces a sufficient
increase in permanent welfare equality.
A reverse reasoning applies when 0 < ρ < ǫ. We then have that Mx(ǫ; ρ) < 0
and that the welfare cost of income variability dominates the beneficial effect
that income mobility has on the equalization of permanent welfare. Mobility-
accounting social welfare Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) is then lower than time-anonymous social wel-
fare Wx(ρ). An increase in periodic income variability can still improve social
4The proof of this can be found in the Appendix.
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welfare Wχ(ǫ)(ρ), but it will then need to generate a sufficiently large fall in per-
manent welfare inequality.
To see this better, consider Figure 2. Vectors of two-period pre-tax (x =
(x1, x2)) and post-tax (y = (y1, y2)) incomes are shown for two individuals,ω = a
and ω = b. Overall mean income is the same pre-tax and post-tax since x(a) +
x(b) = y(a) + y(b). There is no pre-tax income variability: x1(ω) = x2(ω) =
x(ω) = χ(ω; ǫ) for both individuals. But there is pre-tax inequality in permanent
welfare since χ(a; ǫ) < χ(b; ǫ). Because y(a) = y(b) and γ(a; ǫ) = γ(a; ǫ), the
tax system equalizes post-tax permanent welfare perfectly, but it also introduces
temporal variability since we now have that y1(ω) 6= y2(ω) and that y(ω) >
γ(ω; ǫ) for all ǫ > 0. The question then is: does the tax system increase social
welfare?
The answer depends on the social evaluator’s comparative aversion to variabil-
ity across time and to inequality across individuals. The pre-tax and post-tax dis-
tributions of periodic incomes are the same in Figure 2. Hence, a time anonymous
social evaluation would judge the pre-tax and post-tax distributions as welfare
equivalent. If time anonymity is removed, then the relative social evaluation of
pre- and post-tax incomes will depend on the social evaluator’s comparative aver-
sion to income variability across time and to welfare inequality across individuals.
Indifference towards variability across time will necessarily make the post-tax dis-
tribution better: Wχ(ǫ=0)(ρ) < Wγ(ǫ=0)(ρ) = γ(a; ǫ = 0) = γ(b; ǫ = 0) for all in-
equality aversion parameter values ρ > 0. Indifference towards inequality across
individuals will conversely make the pre-tax distribution better.
For common values of ǫ and ρ, the pre-tax and post-tax distributions in Figure
2 have the same social welfare level, and that level is also the same as for time-
anonymous social welfare. The social welfare benefit of the reduction in perma-
nent welfare inequality that redistribution introduces is then exactly canceled out
by the social welfare cost of greater income variability that redistribution intro-
duces in Figure 2. A greater aversion to inequality makes the post-tax distribution
preferable: Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) < Wγ(ǫ)(ρ) for any ǫ < ρ. The converse is true for ǫ > ρ:
the pre-tax distribution is then better.
Figure 2 also shows the role of time anonymity in social evaluations. Say
that an alternative post-tax distribution is given by y∗(ω). Mean post-tax income
is unchanged. Post-tax inequality is still nil but y∗ now displays more temporal
variability than y. y∗ is thus worse than y. For a sufficiently large aversion to
inequality across individuals, the distribution of y∗(ω) will, however, be judged
better than the distribution of pre-tax incomes. This is so even though the periodic
pre-tax distributions of incomes are judged individually better (for both periods,
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since they display less inequality) than the periodic post-tax distributions of in-
comes. Whether this worsening in the periodic income distributions is judged
welfare improving depends not only on the aversion to inequality in permanent
welfare, but also on the aversion to income variability across time. The greater
the aversion to welfare inequality, the more likely will the distribution of y∗(ω)
be judged better than the distribution of x(ω).
3.2 Marginal rates of substitution
We can further use Figure 2 to illustrate the marginal rates of substitution
(MRS) of incomes across time and across individuals. MRS show by how much
one income needs to be changed to keep constant social welfare W when another
income changes. Consider an intra-individual-a change in incomes y1(a) and
y2(a). The relevant MRS is given by:
∂y2(a)
∂y1(a)
∣∣∣∣
W constant
= −
(
y2(a)
y1(a)
)ǫ
. (13)
If, as in Figure 2, y2(a) > y1(a), (13) says that we can sacrifice more than one
dollar of y2(a) when y1(a) increases by one dollar and still maintain social welfare
constant. The larger the ratio of y2(a) to y1(a), and the larger the value of ǫ, the
greater in absolute value is the MRS.
We can also consider a common-time-period between-individual change in
incomes involving variations in x2(b) and y∗2(a), say. This example is chosen be-
cause although x(b) can certainly be judged better than y∗(a), making a transfer
from x2(b) to y∗2(a) increases income variability for both individuals. It also in-
creases income inequality in period 2 (and leaves unchanged income inequality
in period 1). It is thus conceivable that this transfer from a better-off to a lesser-
off individual may decrease overall social welfare in the presence of aversion to
income variability. The corresponding MRS is given by:
∂x2(b)
∂y∗2(a)
∣∣∣∣
W constant
= −
(
x2(b)
y∗2(a)
)ǫ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
income variability ·
·
(
χ(b)
γ∗(a)
)ρ−ǫ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare inequality
. (14)
Equation (14) provides an explicit tradeoff between the cost of increasing income
variability (and/or periodic income inequality), and the benefit of increasing wel-
fare equality. Increasing y∗2(a) by one dollar and decreasing x2(b) by the same one
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dollar increases income variability: the first term on the right-hand-side of (14)
says that this tends to decrease social welfare (since x2(b) < y∗2(a)). Increasing
y∗2(a) by one dollar and decreasing x2(b) by the same one dollar increases welfare
equality; since χ(b) > γ∗(a), the first term on the right-hand-side of equation (14)
also says that this tends to increase social welfare whenever ρ − ǫ > 0. The net
effect depends on the relative importance of the two terms. If ρ = 0, (14) yields
∂x2(b)
∂y∗2(a)
∣∣∣∣
W constant
= −
[
x2(b)
χ(b)
/
y∗2(a)
γ∗(a)
]ǫ
> −1. (15)
The transfer from x2(b) to y∗2(a) then has a solely welfare decreasing effect of
increasing income variability and periodic inequality. If ρ = ǫ, (14) yields
∂x2(b)
∂y∗2(a)
∣∣∣∣
W constant
= −
(
x2(b)
y∗2(a)
)ǫ
> −1, (16)
and we are back to (13). The transfer from x2(b) to y∗2(a) again decreases wel-
fare since it increases time-anonymous income inequality. For a sufficiently
large value of ρ − ǫ, however, the equality-enhancing effect can be judged to
be sufficiently strong to offset the variability-increasing effect, so that time-non-
anonymous social welfare increases. This is necessarily the case whenever ρ > ǫ.
Note that this condition is implied by the following view that a mobile society
(with given cross-sectional inequality) should be deemed better than an immobile
society:
“Consider two societies that have the same distribution of annual in-
come. In one there is great mobility and change so that the position
of particular families in the income hierarchy varies widely from year
to year. In the other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in
the same position year after year. Clearly, in any meaningful sense,
the second would be the more unequal society.” (Friedman 1962)
3.3 Impact of taxation on variability
The cost of variability in post-tax income, namely, M1y (ǫ; ρ), can also be de-
composed as:
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M1y (ǫ, ρ) = Wγ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wy(ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(<0: cost of income variability in post-tax incomes)
(17)
= Wξ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wy(ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(<0: cost of pre-tax income variability )
(18)
+ Wγ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wξ(ǫ)(ρ).︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0: (fall in cost of income variability due to tax system)
(19)
Expression (17) is the difference between post-tax social welfare and post-tax
social welfare without income variability. It is thus the welfare cost of post-tax
income variability. Expression (18) is the difference between post-tax social wel-
fare with pre-tax income variability and post-tax social welfare without income
variability. It is thus the welfare cost of pre-tax income variability, as measured
on the distribution of post-tax incomes. Expression (19) is the difference between
post-tax social welfare and post-tax social welfare with pre-tax income variabil-
ity. This is thus the social welfare benefit of the reduction of income variability
induced by the tax system. The sum of (18) and (19) is the cost of income vari-
ability in post-tax incomes. This also says that if the cost of income variability
across time is reduced by a tax system, then the post-tax distribution will show a
lower welfare cost of income variability than the pre-tax one.
3.4 Impact of taxation on the social welfare effect of mobility
As mentioned above, both aspects of mobility can be expected to be improved
by a progressive tax system:
1. an equalizing tax system reduces the variability of periodic incomes around
permanent incomes;
2. a redistributive tax system makes permanent post-tax welfare more equal
than permanent pre-tax welfare.
Using (11), let the impact of the tax system on mobility be expressed as
∆M(ǫ; ρ) ≡My(ǫ; ρ)−Mx(ǫ; ρ) = ∆M
1(ǫ; ρ) + ∆M2(ρ), (20)
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where ∆M1(ǫ; ρ) = M1y (ǫ; ρ)−M1x(ǫ; ρ) and ∆M2(ρ) = M2y (ρ)−M2x(ρ). This
is the difference in the welfare impact of mobility before and after tax. ∆M1(ǫ; ρ)
shows the welfare effect of taxation on income variability, and ∆M2(ρ) shows the
welfare effect of taxation on permanent welfare inequality. As argued above, a
progressive tax system is expected to strengthen both of these aspects of mobility.
3.5 Overall effect of taxation on social welfare
Recall that Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) is the EDEI of individual pre-tax welfare levels, that is,
the EDEI of the distribution of pre-tax individual permanent incomes corrected
for the cost of income variability. Wγ(ǫ)(ρ) is analogously defined as the EDEI of
individual post-tax welfare levels. Let then Γ(ǫ; ρ) = Wγ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) be the
total effect of taxation on such EDEI welfare. Note that Γ(ǫ = 0; ρ) is the welfare
effect of taxation on the distribution of permanent incomes. We then have:
Proposition 1 With degrees ǫ and ρ of aversion to income variability across time
and to welfare inequality across individuals, respectively, the social welfare effect
of the tax system on the distribution of individual welfare is given by
Γ(ǫ; ρ) = (Wy(ρ)−Wx(ρ)) + ∆M
1(ǫ; ρ) + ∆M2(ρ) (21)
= Γ(0; ρ) + ∆M1(ǫ; ρ). (22)
See appendix.
Let us consider the different components of (21) and (22). Wy(ρ) −Wx(ρ)
is the social welfare effect of the tax system on periodic incomes. This is the
difference in anonymous social welfare; it fails to take into account both 1) the
permanent welfare equalization effect and 2) and the income variability reduction
effect of the tax system. This is corrected in (21) by ∆M1(ǫ; ρ) and ∆M2(ρ).
∆M1(ǫ; ρ) is the effect of the tax system on income variability, and ∆M2(ρ) is
the effect of the tax system on permanent income inequality. By (21), the extent to
which the tax system is judged welfare improving will then depend upon its ability
1) to equalize the distribution of periodic incomes; 2) to reduce the cost of income
variability compared to the no-tax baseline; and 3) to reduce the cost of permanent
welfare inequality, also relative to the no-tax scenario. Result (22) alternatively
says that the net impact of the tax system on social welfare will depend on its
ability to equalize permanent income, Γ(0; ρ), and to reduce the pre-tax cost of
welfare variability, ∆M1(ǫ; ρ).
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3.6 Combined effect of mobility and taxation on social welfare
We can also think of the combined effect of mobility and taxation on social
welfare. This is the social welfare difference between the distribution of periodic
pre-tax incomes, Fx, and the distribution of post-tax incomes adjusted for the cost
of variability. Let Λ(ǫ; ρ) = Wγ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wx(ρ) be this combined effect of mobility
and taxation on social welfare.
Corollary 2 With degrees ǫ and ρ of aversion to income variability across time
and to welfare inequality across individuals, respectively, the combined effect of
mobility and the tax system on social welfare is given by
Λ(ǫ; ρ) = Mx(ǫ; ρ) + Γ(ǫ; ρ) (23)
= Mx(ǫ; ρ) + ∆M
1(ǫ; ρ) + Γ(0; ρ). (24)
See appendix.
For a progressive tax system, Γ(ǫ; ρ) is positive. However, Mx(ǫ; ρ) may be
positive or negative according to whether the social welfare loss from pre-tax
income variability is larger than the social welfare benefit of the equalization of
permanent pre-tax welfare. For instance, as ǫ increases, the pre-tax EDEI χ(ω; ǫ)
approaches the lowest pre-tax income individual ω can experience. This may yield
welfare losses from mobility that are too large to be offset by the equalizing effects
of the tax system.
For ease of reference, the notation on the above decompositions of the effects
of mobility and taxation is summarized in Table 2.
4 Statistical procedures
We will need to use panel data below to estimate individual-level EDEIs and
aggregate social welfare levels. Such panel data will, however, typically involve
a relatively modest number of time periods (at least compared to the number of
individuals observed). This can create biases between the expected value of sam-
ple estimates and the value of the true (unobserved) individual and social welfare
levels. The effects of mobility and taxation on social welfare will also be biased
since they are obtained as differences across such biased estimators.
We therefore introduce procedures that correct, at least partially, for these bi-
ases. We detail the nature of these corrections for estimating γ(ω; ǫ); similar
reasoning and corrections apply to χ(ω; ǫ) and ξ(ω; ǫ).
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4.1 Analytical bias corrections
Assume that, for each individual ω in our sample, a number of periodic in-
come values are drawn randomly from an individual-specific distribution function
Fy|ω(·). Let γ(ǫ;ω) be the true (as opposed to the estimated) EDEI of individual
ω — see equation (6) for its formal definition using the true distribution function
F . A natural estimator of γ(ǫ;ω) is given by γˆ(ǫ;ω),
γˆ(ω; ǫ) = U−1ǫ
(∫
Uǫ(z)dFˆy|ω(z)
)
= U−1ǫ
(
t−1
t∑
j=1
Uǫ (yj(ω))
)
, (25)
where t is the number of periodic observations drawn for individual ω (assumed to
be the same for all individuals), yj(ω) is income observed at time j for individual
ω, and Fˆy|ω(z) is the empirical (or sample) distribution of periodic incomes y for
individual ω.
The estimator in (25) is, however, biased for a small number of time periods
since γ(ǫ;ω) is non linear in incomes yj . To see this, define δ = 1− ǫ, G(δ;ω) =∫
zδdFy|ω(z), and Gˆ(δ;ω) =
∫
zδdFˆy|ω(z). Using a Taylor expansion, we then
have that
E [γˆ(δ;ω)] = E
[
γ(δ;ω) + δ−1γ(δ, ω)(1−δ)/δ
[
Gˆ(δ;ω)−G(δ, ω)
]
−0.5δ−2(δ − 1)γ(δ, ω)(1−2δ)/δ
[
Gˆ(δ;ω)−G(δ, ω)
]2
+ ...
]
. (26)
Since
E
[
Gˆ(δ;ω)−G(δ;ω)
]
= 0,
and
E
[(
Gˆ(δ;ω)−G(δ;ω)
)2]
= t−1var (y(ω)) ,
we have (to leading order) that
E [γˆ(δ;ω)] ∼= γ(δ;ω)− 0.5δ−2(δ − 1)γ(δ;ω)(1−2δ)/δt−1var (y(ω))
≥ γ(δ;ω). (27)
This shows that γˆ(δ;ω) is biased upwards (as δ − 1 < 0). A second-order correc-
tion for γˆ(δ;ω) is thus given by:
γ̂(δ;ω) = γˆ(δ;ω) + 0.5δ−2(δ − 1)γ(δ;ω)(1−2δ)/δt−1var (y(ω)) . (28)
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All of the elements in (28) can be estimated consistently.
Equations (26) to (28) can be similarly applied to the individuals’ pre-tax
incomes to provide second-order bias corrections for the natural estimator for
χ(δ;ω). Given (7), this also provides second-order corrections to the natural esti-
mator for ξ(ω; ǫ). Applying bias corrections of order t−1 to estimators for γ(ω; ǫ),
χ(δ;ω) and ξ(ω; ǫ) also provides bias corrections of the same order to estimators
of Wγ(ǫ)(ρ), Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) and Wξ(ǫ)(ρ) since these estimators exhibit biases of the
same order of magnitude.
4.2 Bootstrap bias corrections
An alternative approach to correcting for the biases found in and (27) is by es-
timating the biases that arise in numerical simulations of the periodic distributions
of incomes. This can be done by bootstrapping the empirical distribution of each
individual’s periodic incomes. We can proceed as follows:
1. For each individual ω observed in the sample, we first compute a “plug-
in” estimator using ω’s original sample of periodic incomes; this is simply
γˆ(ǫ;ω).
2. Then, again for each individual ω, we generate K samples, k = 1, ..., K,
of periodic incomes, each sample being composed of t incomes drawn ran-
domly (and with replacement) from the original observations of incomes
for individual ω. We thus compute a new estimator γk(ǫ;ω) for each k. K
should be as large as is numerically sufficient and computationally reason-
able.
3. Denoting by γ∗(ǫ;ω) the mean of these K estimators γk(ǫ;ω); that is, let
γ∗(ǫ;ω) = K−1
∑K
k=1 γk(ǫ;ω). The bootstrap estimate of the bias is then
given by the difference between γ∗(ǫ;ω) and the plug-in estimator γˆ(ǫ;ω).
The γ(ǫ;ω) for each of the individuals ω can then be corrected by the
bootstrap-estimated biases, γ∗(ǫ;ω) − γˆ(ǫ;ω), leading to a bootstrap-corrected
estimator given by
γ˜(ǫ;ω) = γˆ(ǫ;ω)− (γ∗(ǫ;ω)− γˆ(ǫ;ω))
= 2γˆ(ǫ;ω)− γ∗(ǫ;ω).
(29)
Bootstrap bias corrections can sometimes work better than asymptotic ones with
small t since they are not restricted to the leading terms listed in (26). They come,
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however, at a larger computational cost. A similar procedure to the above can be
applied to compute χ˜(ǫ;ω) and ξ˜(ǫ;ω).
5 Empirical application using Canadian data
We now turn to investigating the empirical social welfare effects of mobility
and taxation. For this, we use panel data from the Canadian Survey of Labor and
Income Dynamics (SLID). The panel runs from 1996 with 38567 observations
to 2001 with only 31451 observations. Each household is observed 5.7 times on
average, which is close to the six-year total length of the panel. More descriptive
details on this panel can be found in Table 3.
Pre-tax-and-benefit income is called “market income” in the SLID. It includes
wages and salaries, self-employment income, private pensions and investment in-
come. Post-tax-and-post-benefit income is market income plus transfers minus
taxes, and is referred to as “disposable income” in the SLID. Transfers include
federal and provincial child and family allowances, old age security pensions and
guaranteed income supplement, employment insurance benefits, social assistance
benefits, and various tax credits. Taxes include both provincial and federal per-
sonal income taxes.
Note that consumption might be deemed to be a better indicator of living stan-
dards than income. Longitudinal and nationally representative consumption data
are not available, however, in Canada (and are rare elsewhere too). The implicit
assumption, therefore, is that all income variability is costly to the individual, even
though the anticipation of income changes, borrowing and saving, and insurance
will generally help smooth consumption in the presence of income variability. It
is also the case that a panel longer than 6 years would probably be better than the
one provided by SLID. Again, this is not available in Canada.
Finally, note that we do not allow for the effect of taxation on behavior, such
as labor supply and savings behavior. It would be interesting to take into account
such effects of taxation on intertemporal behavioral, but this is beyond the scope
of the current paper.
To adjust for differences in household composition, we use the equivalence
scale traditionally used by Statistics Canada, which assigns a weight of 1 to the
household head, of 0.4 to each additional adult, and of 0.3 to each child less than
16 years old. We also normalize incomes such that the mean of pre- and post-tax
incomes per equivalent adult equals 100 at each time period.
Asymptotic and bootstrap bias corrections reduce by roughly 2 to 5 percent
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the estimates of the different indices of mobility and social welfare. Both turn out
to yield almost identical estimates. For expositional simplicity, we thus use only
the asymptotic correction below.
5.1 The welfare effect of mobility and taxation in Canada
The impact of mobility on social welfare is summarized in Table 4 for various
values of ǫ and ρ. For ǫ between 0.3 and 0.9, the cost of variability in pre-tax
income (M1x(ǫ; ρ)) ranges from 2.09 to 10.84 percent of pre-tax mean income.5
The tax system reduces considerably, however, the periodic variability of incomes;
for instance, the variability cost (M1y (ǫ; ρ)) is more than halved for ǫ = ρ ≥ 0.6.
The variability cost of mobility is thus decreased significantly by the tax system.
Table 4 also shows the impact of mobility on the equalization of permanent
pre-tax and post-tax welfare (M2x and M2y ). For 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.9, the equalization
benefit ranges from 1.8% to 10.84% of mean pre-tax incomes and from 1.02% to
3.77% of mean post-tax income. Thus, mobility enhances equality significantly in
both distributions of income, but substantially more so in the absence of taxes and
transfers. The net effect of mobility on social welfare is dominated by mobility’s
benefit for ǫ < ρ and by mobility’s cost for ǫ > ρ.
The effect of mobility and taxation on periodic income variability is shown
in the two panels of Figure 3. The top panel deals with pre-tax incomes and the
bottom panel, with post-tax incomes. The horizontal axes show the percentiles p
of the population ordered by increasing levels of permanent incomes. The levels
of permanent incomes that correspond to the different percentiles are shown on
the left vertical axis (as a percentage of overall mean permanent incomes). The
cost of income variability as a percentage of overall mean income is shown on the
right vertical axis. This is the effect of periodic income variability on individual
welfare: χ(p; ǫ = 0)−χ(p; ǫ) for the top panel of Figure 3 and γ(p; ǫ = 0)−γ(p; ǫ)
for the bottom panel of the same figure, both relative to overall mean income.
Figure 3 shows both the welfare cost of income variability and the effect that
taxation has on it. The top panel shows that the welfare cost of pre-tax income
variability can be significant. For the lower values 0.3 and 0.6 of relative risk
5Jim Davies kindly suggested a useful way to interpret these numbers. Assume that there is
only one individual with two possible income levels, yl and yh, each with a 50% probability of
being realized. Then M1y (ǫ = 0.3; ρ) = 2.09 is obtained with yl = 63.3 and yh = 136.7. If
consumption smoothing decreased by 25% the implied variability (through borrowing/saving or
some partial insurance schemes), then M1y (ǫ = 0.3; ρ) would fall to 1.16. This is approximately
the level of the cost of mobility in post-tax income reported in Table 4.
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aversion, this costs is between 2% and 5% of permanent pre-tax incomes. Said
differently, individuals would be willing to pay a premium of the order of 2% to
5% of their permanent incomes to smooth their periodic incomes. For a larger
value of 0.9 of relative risk aversion, that percentage is almost always above 5%
at all percentiles, and can even exceed 10% for the top decile or permanent pre-tax
incomes.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 indicates that the welfare cost of income vari-
ability is roughly reduced by half by the tax system, no matter what percentile
is considered. For instance, at the 0.6 median value of the relative risk aversion
parameter ǫ, the welfare cost of post-tax income variability is about 2% of per-
manent incomes — as oppose to 4%-5% for pre-tax income variability. This is a
substantial welfare gain that is typically ignored in most welfare analyses of the
tax and transfer system.
Let us turn consider the overall social welfare effects of the tax system. As
Proposition 1 illustrates, these effects have two sources. Both of them can be
understood from the two panels of Figure 4, which show pre-tax and post-tax
permanent income levels (on the left vertical axes) for different percentiles of
permanent incomes and the cost of income variability (on the right vertical axes)
as a percentage of those permanent incomes. The top panel of Figure 4 does this
for ǫ = 0.3 and the second panel, for ǫ = 0.6.
As (22) in Proposition 1 indicates, the first social welfare effect of the tax sys-
tem comes from the tax equalization of permanent incomes. The top left panel of
Figure 4 shows that for 95 percent of the population, pre-tax permanent income
x(ω) ranges from 0 percent to around 200 percent of mean pre-tax permanent
incomes. The tax narrows considerably this range. The top and bottom panels
indeed show that the tax system brings the lowest permanent post-tax incomes to
around 40 percent of mean post-tax incomes; the tax system reduces correspond-
ingly the top permanent income levels from 200% to 170% of the average. (The
break-even point is approximately at the 55th percentile.) The quantitative wel-
fare impact of this redistribution of permanent incomes is given in Table 5, which
shows that Γ(0; ρ) in (22) can reach up to 22.63 percent of mean income when
ρ = 0.9.
The second social welfare effect of the tax system comes from the system’s
equalization of periodic incomes. This was already visible in Figure 3. It is also
apparent in Figure 4, where the variability cost of income variability (as a propor-
tion of percentile-specific permanent incomes) is reduced at all percentiles, and
most strongly at the lower percentiles. Take ǫ = 0.3 for instance. For the bottom
0.25 percentiles for instance, the variability of pre-tax income causes a cost of
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between 5% and 25% of permanent incomes; that cost drops to less than 2% for
post-tax incomes. Again, the welfare effect of the system’s equalization of peri-
odic incomes is strongest at the lowest percentiles; it is also about twice as large
for ǫ = 0.6 than for ǫ = 0.3.
Quantitative estimates of the overall effects on social welfare of both mobility
and taxation are further shown in Table 5. The effect of taxation on social welfare
is given by Γ(ǫ; ρ); the net effect of mobility on pre-tax social welfare is given
by Mx(ǫ; ρ); Λ(ǫ; ρ) is the combined welfare effect of taxation and mobility. Fol-
lowing Corollary 2, the redistributive benefit of the tax system may be enhanced,
decreased, or even outdone by the effect of mobility on pre-tax incomes.
Table 5 shows that the net effect of both mobility and taxation on social wel-
fare is usually non-negative. The only exception is given by ρ = 0 when ǫ > 0.
From Proposition 1 and Corollary 2, we can indeed show that Λ(ǫ; 0) = M1y (ǫ; 0),
meaning that the only effect that matters in the absence of an aversion to inequality
in permanent welfare is that of post-tax income variability. Unless taxation elimi-
nates income variability completely, the combined effect of taxation and mobility
on social welfare then has to be strictly negative.
Otherwise, redistribution and mobility can have a considerable effect on social
welfare. Pre-tax anonymous social welfare can be as low as 55% of mean income.
(Wx(ρ = 0.9)). With ǫ = 0.6 and ρ = 0.9, mobility increases that level of social
welfare to 61% of mean income (Wχ(ǫ=0.6)(ρ = 0.9)). The effect of taxation
moves that up to 87% of mean income (Wγ(ǫ=0.6)(ρ = 0.9)). Had taxation not
considerably decreased initial income variability, post-tax social welfare would
have been 80.6% of mean income (Wξ(ǫ=0.6)(ρ = 0.9)). Hence, a considerable
part of the welfare impact of taxation is through the equalization of permanent
welfare.
Overall, the welfare impact of mobility and taxation can be very important.
For ǫ = 0.6 and ρ = 0.9, for instance, the combined impact is 31.25% of mean
income, with 26.08 percentage points originating from the effect of taxation on
social welfare. For all choices of parameter values, the tax effect exceeds by far
the net effect of mobility on social welfare.
6 Conclusion
Social evaluations of welfare distributions are generally based on periodic,
“time-anonymous”, income distributions. It has long been recognized, however,
that such evaluations can provide unsatisfactory accounts of welfare, especially
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when individuals care about the inter-temporal allocation of their incomes and
when societies have to trade off the advantage of mobility as a reducer of inequal-
ity in permanent incomes and the drawback of mobility as a source of variability
of periodic incomes around permanent incomes.
This paper shows how the effect of mobility on social welfare can be decom-
posed into two components, one owing to “mobility as equalizer” (in line with
most previous studies of mobility) and the other due to mobility as a source of
income variability. Relative to time-anonymous social evaluations, the net impact
of mobility is ambiguous and depends upon the comparative degree of aversion
to income variability across time and to income inequality across individuals. It
is also shown in this setting how redistributive tax and transfer policies may serve
not only to increase the equality of the distribution of permanent incomes, but also
to achieve a greater stability of individual incomes across time.
We use this framework to investigate both the combined and the comparative
impacts of mobility and taxation on individual and social welfare in Canada. Re-
distribution and mobility (both usually argued to be important income equalizers)
can have a considerable effect on social welfare, the precise effect depending on
aversions to variability and inequality. For usual values of such aversion parame-
ters, pre-tax anonymous social welfare can be as low as 55% of mean income; mo-
bility increases that level of social welfare to 61% of mean income, and taxation
moves it up to 87%. Mobility enhances equality significantly in both distributions
of income, but substantially more so in the absence of taxes and transfers. The
results also show that Canada’s tax and transfer system enhances considerably the
redistributive effects of mobility while also lowering the cost of income variabil-
ity; for all choices of parameter values, the effect of taxation also exceeds by far
the net effect of mobility on social welfare.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Recall that Γ(ǫ; ρ) = Wγ(ǫ)(ρ) −Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) stands for the effect of taxation on
social welfare:
Wγ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) (30)
= Wγ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wy(ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(M1
y
(ǫ;ρ): post-tax cost of mobility)
(31)
+ Wy(ρ)−Wx(ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Γ(0;ρ): equalization of permanent incomes by the tax system)
(32)
− Wχ(ǫ)(ρ)−Wx(ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(M1
x
(ǫ;ρ): pre-tax cost of mobility.)
(33)
Since χ(ω; ǫ = 0) = x(ω) and γ(ω; ǫ = 0) = y(ω), Γ(ǫ; ρ) can be expressed
as:
Γ(ǫ; ρ) = ∆M1(ǫ; ρ) + Γ(0; ρ). (34)
Rearranging (32) by adding and subtracting (Wy(ρ)−Wx(ρ)), and using (12)
and (20), Proposition 1 is obtained.
Proofs of two statements made on page 7.
For the first statement, which follows equation (7), note that there is a simple
relationship between EDEI and permanent incomes,
χ(ω; ǫ) = x(ω) (1− Ix(ω; ǫ)) ,
γ(ω; ǫ) = y(ω) (1− Iy(ω; ǫ)) , (35)
where It(ω; ǫ) is the cost of mobility (proportional to permanent income) for an
individual ω. Is(ω; ǫ) takes the value of 0 when the s’s are equally distributed over
time, and is increasing in the time variability of individual incomes.
Thus, rearranging (7) using (35) yields
ξ(ω; ǫ) = γ(ω; ǫ)
(1− Ix(ω; ǫ))
(1− Iy(ω; ǫ))
. (36)
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It is well known that Atkinson’s (1970) social welfare function is homothetic. For
a proportional tax system, we therefore have that Ix(ω; ǫ) = Iy(ω; ǫ) and this
naturally leads to ξ(ω; ǫ) = γ(ω; ǫ). By the Fellman-Jakobsson theorem (Jakob-
sson 1976 and Fellman 1976), the greater the progressivity of the tax system, the
greater the fall in income variability across periods, and thus the greater the gap
between γ(ω; ǫ) and ξ(ω; ǫ).
Turn now to the second statement, which follows equation (12). For ǫ = ρ,
equation (8) can be rewritten as
Wχ(ρ)(ρ) = U
−1
ρ
(∫
Uρ(χ(ω; ρ))dFΩ(ω)
)
. (37)
Note from equation (5) that
χ(ω; ρ) = U−1ρ
(∫
Uρ(z)dFy|ω(z)
)
. (38)
Using equation (38) to rearrange (37), the second statement is obtained for
pre-tax incomes. The same procedure applies for Wy(ρ) = Wγ(ρ)(ρ).
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Table 1: Notation for individual and social welfare distributions
Incomes Distributions Permanent Individual Social Social EDEI
income of EDEI EDEI of permanent
individual ω incomes
Pre-tax x Fx x(ω) χ(ω; ǫ) Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) Wx(ρ)
Post-tax y Fy y(ω) γ(ω; ǫ) Wγ(ǫ)(ρ) Wy(ρ)
Post-tax with y(ω)x(ω)
x(ω)
y(ω) ξ(ω; ǫ) Wξ(ǫ)(ρ) Wy(ρ)
pre-tax variability
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Table 2: Notation for the decompositions of the effects of mobility and taxation
Incomes Net effect Effect of Effect of Social EDEI Anonymous Anonymous
of mobility mobility on mobility with social EDEI pre-tax and
on social EDEI variability on inequality mobility EDEI post-tax
(a) Pre-tax Mx M1x M2x Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) Wx(ρ) Wx(ρ)
(b) Post-tax My M1y M2y Wγ(ǫ)(ρ) Wy(ρ) Wγ(ǫ)(ρ)
(b) minus (a) ∆M ∆M1 ∆M2 Γ(ǫ; ρ) Wy(ρ)−Wx(ρ) Λ(ǫ; ρ)
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on SLID’s panel data
1996 1997 1998
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Household size 2.42 1.4 2.40 1.41 2.38 1.4
Equivalent adults 1.52 0.49 1.51 0.5 1.51 0.5
Per capita market income 15 846 16 590 16 575 18 415 17 568 19 792
Per capita net income 14 963 10 519 15 595 11 583 16 354 12 522
1999 2000 2001
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Household size 2.36 1.39 2.35 1.37 2.34 1.36
Equivalent adults 1.50 0.49 1.50 0.49 1.50 0.49
Per capita market income 18 892 23 365 20 334 21 817 21 483 27 387
Per capita net income 17 415 14 229 18 628 13 927 20 144 17078
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Table 4: The social welfare effect of mobility in pre- and post-tax incomes in Canada, 1996-2001 (mean incomes
are normalized to 100)
Pre-tax income Post-tax income Effect of taxation on mobility
ǫ ρ M1x(ǫ; ρ) M
2
x(ρ) Mx(ǫ; ρ) M
1
y (ǫ; ρ) M
2
y (ρ) My(ǫ; ρ) ∆M
1(ǫ; ρ) ∆M2(ρ) ∆M(ǫ; ρ)
0 0.3 0 1.80 1.80 0 1.02 1.02 0 -0.78 -0.78
0 0.6 0 4.50 4.50 0 2.15 2.15 0 -2.35 -2.35
0 0.9 0 10.84 10.84 0 3.77 3.77 0 -7.07 -7.07
0.3 0 -2.09 0 -2.09 -1.26 0 -1.26 0.83 0 0.83
0.3 0,9 -2.30 10.84 8.54 -1.03 3.77 2.74 1.27 -7.07 -5.8
0.6 0.3 -4.17 1.80 -2.37 -2.25 1.02 -1.23 1.93 -0.78 1.15
0.6 0.6 -4.50 4.50 0 -2.15 2.15 0 2.36 -2.35 0
0.6 0.9 -5.67 10.84 5.17 -2.22 3.77 1.55 3.44 -7.07 -3.63
0.9 0.6 -7.89 4.50 -3.39 -3.53 2.15 -1.38 4.37 -2.35 2.01
0.9 0.9 -10.84 10.84 0 -3.77 3.77 0 7.07 -7.07 0
M1s (ǫ; ρ): effect of mobility on variability; M2s (ρ): effect of mobility on inequality; Ms(ǫ; ρ): net effect of mobility
on social welfare; ∆: effect of movement from pre-tax to post-tax distribution.
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Table 5: The impact of taxation and mobility on social welfare Canada, 1996-2001 (mean incomes are normalized
to 100)
Levels of social welfare Overall impact
Pre-tax income Post-tax income on social welfare
ǫ ρ Wx(ρ) Wx(ρ) Wχ(ǫ)(ρ) Wy(ρ) Wy(ρ) Wγ(ǫ)(ρ) Wξ(ǫ)(ρ) Γ(ǫ; ρ) Mx(ǫ; ρ) Λ(ǫ; ρ)
0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0
0 0.3 89.27 91.07 91.07 95.12 96.15 96.15 96.15 5.07 1.8 6.86
0 0.6 76.41 80.91 80.91 90.36 92.51 92.51 92.51 11.6 4.5 16.1
0 0.9 55.52 66.36 66.36 85.22 88.99 88.99 88.99 22.63 10.84 33.47
0.3 0 - - 97.91 - - 98.74 96.93 0.83 -2.09 -1.26
0.3 0.9 - - 64.06 - - 87.96 85.6 23.9 8.54 32.45
0.6 0.3 - - 86.90 - - 93.89 90.06 7 -2.37 4.63
0.6 0.6 - - 76.41 - - 90.36 85.67 13.95 0 13.95
0.6 0.9 - - 60.69 - - 86.77 80.6 26.08 5.17 31.25
0.9 0.6 - - 73.02 - - 88.98 80.77 15.96 -3.39 12.57
0.9 0.9 - - 55.52 - - 85.22 73.06 29.71 0 29.71
Ws(ρ): time-anonymous social welfare; Ws(ρ): permanent income social welfare; Wχ(ǫ)(ρ): pre-tax social welfare;
Wγ(ǫ)(ρ): post-tax social welfare; Wξ(ǫ)(ρ) post-tax social welfare with pre-tax income variability; Γ(ǫ; ρ): effect
of taxation on social welfare; Mx(ǫ; ρ): net effect of mobility on pre-tax social welfare; Λ(ǫ; ρ): combined effect
of taxation and mobility on social welfare
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Figure 1: Welfare with temporal income variability
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Figure 2: Effects of taxation and mobility on income variability across time and
inequality across individuals
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Figure 3: The cost of pre- and post-tax income variability according to different
levels of aversion ǫ to inter-temporal variability, Canada 1996-2001
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Panel B: The cost of post−tax income variability
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Figure 4: The impact of taxation on permanent income and on the cost of tempo-
ral variability, for two different levels of aversion ǫ to inter-temporal variability,
Canada 1996-2001 (as a percentage of permanent income)
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